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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
(~EORC-E C. MAW, W. EUGENE 
l\lA\V, ORLO S. MAW and FER-
RELL J. MA,V, R. JOHN MAW 
and JlTNIOR B. MAW, VIRGIL 
G. l\lA_,V and VADEL T. MAW, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants_, Civil No. 
vs. 
\YEBER BASIN WATER CON-
SERY.ANCY DISTRICT and 
OGDEN DUCK CLUB, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
) 9950 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
The respondents do not agree with the statement 
of' facts set forth in the appellants' brief. Much of the 
statement is contrary to the record and other parts are 
merely argun1ents. For example, appellants' first asser-
tion under the hearing "Statement of Facts" is: 
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"Since plaintiffs sustained a dismissal of their 
complaint without being afforded the opportu-
nity of presenting the facts to a jury~ they are 
entitled under the well-established rules of law 
to have this court consider the evidence which is 
now in the record and which they might reason-
ably otherwise contend would be established, in 
the light Jnost favorable to themselves." (Em-
phasis added) . 
The transcript of the trial discloses that many 
times the court offered to empanel the jury and to hear 
the evidence in support of the appellants' position, and 
each time the offer was refused. (Tr. 10, 15, 16, 18, 30, 
33, 34, 36, 39 and 40) . 
RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 29, 1936, Annie C. Maw designated 
as "Grantor" and Ogden Duck Club, a corporation, 
and its members, designated "Grantees", entered into 
the following agreement hereinafter referred to as the 
"1936 agreement": 
RIGHT-OF-WAY AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT made between ANNIE 
C. MAW of Plain City, Weber County, Utah, Grantor, 
and OGDEN DUCK CLUB, a Utah corporation, and 
its members, Grantees. 
WITNESSETH: 
Whereas, Grantor is owner of lands in Sections 
20-17-18, Township 7 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake 
Meridian, as now appears of record in the offices of 
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i he l'oun tv Hccordcrs of' \ V eber and Box Elder Coun-
ties, State. of Utah; and 
\ Vhereas, (~rantees and their predecessors in 
interest are now, and have been, using said lands for 
many years for right-of-way purposes; 
~ow therefore, in consideration of $1.00 in hand 
paid and other valuable consideration, receip~ of w:hich 
i" hereby acknowledged and the matters herein recited, 
(~ran tor does hereby give and grant unto Grantees and 
their successors in interest a convenient right-of-way 
over awl across said lands for the purpose of going to 
awl frmn the Club House owned by Grantees in Sec-
t ion 1':.?. Township 7 North, Range 3 West, Salt Lake 
~lcridian, and the shooting grounds of Grantee lying 
North of the above described lands and other lands 
now owned by Grantor, and to construct and maintain 
a ditch, or ditches, at expense of Grantees, in said Sec-
tion 18, Township 7 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake 
Jleridian. for the purpose of conducting water thereon, 
over. and to said Club House and grounds of said 
(;ran tees. This grant shall be exclusive to Grantees as 
to the purposes herein expressed except as to Grantor 
and the members of her family hereinafter mentioned 
so long as Grantees and any successors shall maintain 
said Club House and shooting grounds for the purpose 
of shooting wild fowl. 
In consideration of non-assessable shooting privi-
leges on said shooting grounds of Grantees on days 
excepting the opening day, Saturdays, Sundays, and 
holidays, to be enjoyed by, and hereby granted to, the 
sPns of Grantor named as follows, to-wit: 
\Yihner J. ::\Iaw, Rufus J. Maw, Gilbert Maw, and 
George )law, Grantor, agrees to maintain in a travel-
able cond.ition the road which is a part of the right.:.of-
way herein granted to Grantees, now existing in said 
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Section 20, Township 7 North, Range 2 West, Salt 
Lake Meridian along the North rod of the East half 
of said section; provided that in any year the said 
Wilmer J. Maw, Rufus Maw, Gilbert Maw, and George 
Maw may designate one son for each thereof to shoot 
and enjoy the privileges hereunder in place of such 
son's father; but it is expressly understood that blinds 
on the shooting grounds of Grantees being used at any 
time by said sons shall be given up to members of the 
Ogden Duck Club upon request. 
In consideration of the feed and grazing benefits 
to be enjoyed and hereby granted by the Ogden Duck 
Club to Grantor or her successors on lands controlled 
by said Ogden Duck Club and its successors in the 
vicinity of lands owned by Grantor, Grantor agrees to 
back up all surplus water of the two creeks running 
through lands of the Grantor above the present dam 
located on the North side of the Northeast quarter of 
said Section 20, and to turn water loose through said 
dam at the pleasure of Grantees. 
This agreement shall be binding upon the heirs 
and assigns of the Grantor and the successors and 
assigns of the Grantees. 
Annie C. Maw 
Grantor 
OGDEN DUCK CLUB, a Corporation 
Grantee 
By: A. W. Hestmark 
President 
By: W. H. Reeder Jr. 
Secretary 
(duly acknowledged) 
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Pluintift' (~eorge C. l\law is a son of Annie C. Maw, 
the grantor under the contraet quoted above; plaintiffs 
\Y. }t~ugene ~Lnv, Orlo S. 1\'Iaw and Farrell J. Maw 
are sorts of \Vi ln1er J. 1\tla w, a deceased son of Annie 
l'. ~law; H. John ~law and Junior B. Maw are sons 
ot' Rufus J. ~law, a deceased son of Annie C. Maw; 
plaintiffs Virgil B. 1\tlaw and Vadel T. Maw are sons 
of Gilbert E. Maw, a deceased son of Annie C. Maw. 
The sons of Annie C. 1\'Iaw were Wilmer J. Maw, Rufus 
.J. ~law and Gilbert E. Maw, all of whom are now 
deceased. George C. Maw is the sole surviving son of 
Annie C. Maw. 
The allegations and admissions in the pleadings 
establish that the United States determined that it was 
necessary to acquire the land crossed by the road de-
scribed in the 1936 agreement set out above, for the 
construction of the Willard Bay reservoir, a part of 
the 'V eber Basin project. (R. 2, 39, 40 and 42). Such 
land was purchased by the United States from W. John 
~Iaw and Sons, Inc., a corporation, and Grace B. Maw. 
(R. 3). The road to the duck club was obliterated and 
destroyed as a result of construction activities on the 
\Yillard Bay reservoir. (R. 3, 40, 42). 
The defendant Ogden Duck Club moved its club 
house a bout a mile and a half due west. ( R. 46) . No 
further use '\Vas Inade of the road mentioned in the agree-
ment. The Duck Club secured an alternate route. (R. 
49, 50). 
On July .3. 1957, ~Ir. E. J. Fjeldsted, manager o£ 
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the defendant Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dis-
trict, wrote the following letter toW. John Maw and 
Sons, Inc.: 
WEBER BASIN WATER CONSERVANCY 
DISTRICT 
W. John Maw and Sons, Inc. 
Plain City 
Utah 
Gentlemen: 
Tract Nos. 95, 104, and 106 
Willard Dam and Reservoir 
W. JOHN MAW AND SONS, INC. 
It is our understanding that you have executed a 
contract for the sale to the United States of tract Nos. 
95, 104 and 106, Willard Dam and Reservoir. 
This letter will assure you that the land purchase 
contract does not cover your other property interests in 
the Willard Bay Area, and specifically your state leases, 
water rights, easements, licenses, duck club shooting 
privileges, or lands other than those described in the 
land purchase contract. Any such property interests 
which will be required in the construction of the Dam 
or which will be damaged or destroyed will be appraised 
at a later date and an offer to purchase will be made. 
Yours very truly, 
Is/ E. J. FJELDSTED 
E. J. FJELDSTED 
Manager 
On or about April 7, 1958, the Ogden Duck Club 
executed a Quit Claim Deed to W. John Maw and 
Sons, Inc., and to Grace B. Maw, describing a portion 
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of the land tra ,·ersed hy the duck club road. (See Ex. 
B). 
The duck club has excluded the Maws from the 
rlu b facilities. ( R. 59) . 
The defendants n1oved to dismiss the complaint on 
the ground that it fails to state a claim upon which relief 
l'all be granted. (R. 11). This was denied by Judge 
Cowley. (R. 12). 
\\rhen the case was called for trial with the jury 
present in the courtroom Judge Wahlquist inquired as 
to whether there had been any change of position and 
the court and counsel discussed at some length the ques-
tions of law involved, particularly those relating to the 
IH:W agreement and the Fjeldsted letter set out above. 
The court indicated what the rulings would be on ques-
tions of law and n1any times offered to empanel a jury 
and to hear evidence. These offers were refused by the 
plaintiffs. Details and references to the transcript con-
cerning these offers will be supplied in connection with 
the defendants' argument. The plaintiff offered in evi-
dence Exhibits A, B, C, D, and E, consisting respec-
tively of several copies of the Fjeldsted letter, Quit 
Clain1 Deed, land purchase contract, the Solicitors' letter 
nnd a Inap. (R. 38). No formal offer of other proof was 
made. 
The trial court made findings of fact based upon 
the pleadings and exhibits, and by written judgment 
ordered the cmnplaint dismissed with prejudice. 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The plaintiffs have no rights under the 1936 
agreement. 
2. The plaintiffs were not denied the right to 
adduce evidence in support of their contentions. 
3. The Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dis-
trict is not illegally trespassing on plaintiffs' lands 
and rights. 
4. There was no proof of estoppel against the 
Weber Basin Water Conservancy District. 
5. There was no breach of contract by the Og-
den Duck Club. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO RIGHTS 
UNDER THE 1936 AGREEJ\'IENT. 
The plaintiffs predicated their case against both the 
Weber Basin Water Conservancy District and the 
Ogden Duck Club upon the 1936 agreement. The com-
plaint alleges the execution of the agreement (para-
graph 2) , the relationship of the various plaintiffs with 
Annie C. Maw, signer of the agreement (paragraph 3), 
the obliteration and destruction of the duck club road 
(paragraph 6) , and the breach of the agreement (para-
graphs 7 and 8). The allegations of the complaint which 
relate to estoppel (paragraph 4, 5 and 9) have refer-
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
encc to the shooting privileges clai1ned under the 1936 
agrccnH.·nt. See complaint (R. 1-8). The plaintiffs' 
st.ntement of legal theories ( R. 30-32) clearly indicates 
that the rla in1s asserted are based on the 1936 agree-
ment. The only shooting privileges involved are those 
set out in the agreement. 
\Vhen the case was called for trial the court very 
properly proceeded to examine the contract to deter-
mine whether the plaintiffs had a cause of action under 
the 1936 agreement. The first point considered by the 
court was whether the grandsons of Annie C. Maw had 
rights under the agreement. It will be noted that the 
following language covers this subject: 
" ... In consideration of non-assessable shoot-
ing privileges on said shooting grounds of Gran-
tees on days excepting the opening day, Satur-
days, Sundays, and holidays, to be enjoyed by~ 
and hereby granted to} the sons of Grantor named 
as follows J to-wit: 
TVilmer J. Maw~ RuJus J. Maw} Gilbert Maw} 
and George Maw} Grantor agrees to maintain in 
a traYelable condition the road which is a part of 
the right-of-way herein granted to Grantees, now 
existing in said Section 20, Township 7 North, 
Range 2 ':Vest, Salt Lake Meridian along the 
~ orth rod of th East half of said section; pro-
vided that in any year the said Wilmer J. Maw, 
Rufus ~law, Gilbert Maw, and George Maw 
may designate one son for each thereof to shoot 
and enjoy the privileges hereunder in place of 
such son's father; but it is expressly understood 
that blinds on the shooting grounds of Grantees 
being used at any time by said sons shall be given 
11 
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up to members of the Ogden Duck Club upon 
request ... " (Emphasis added). 
The agreement specifically provides that the privi-
leges are granted "to the sons of Grantor." The only 
reference to the grandsons is found in th proviso which 
reads: 
" ... provided that in any year the said Wilmer 
J. Maw, Rufus Maw, Gilbert Maw and George 
Maw may designate one son for each thereof to 
shoot and enjoy the privilege hereunder in place 
of such son's father ... (Emphasis added). 
The intent is clear that the grant of privilege was 
to the sons of Grantor with the right in any year for the 
son to designate one of his sons to shoot in his place. 
It is fur~her clear that upon the death of a son there 
could be no designation in any year~ so the privilege 
would be gone. The court held that the language was 
. not ambiguous and that the privileges were granted 
to the sons. (Tr. 10). The complaint (paragraph 2) 
alleges that all of the sons named in the agreement 
except George are dead. The only plaintiff who could 
therefore have a claim under any theory was George 
C. Maw. 
The next point considered was whether the shooting 
privileges were conditioned by the terms of the 1936 
agreement upon the performance of certain acts by 
the sons of the Grantor. The language is that: 
" ... In consideration of non-assessable shoot-
ing privileges ... Grantor agrees to maintain in 
a travelable condition the road ... now existing 
12 
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in said Section :20, Township 7 North, Range 2 
\Vest, Salt Lake lVIeridian along the North rod 
of' the East half of said section ... " 
It is alleged in the con1plaint that the road used 
to travel to the duck club was obliterated and destroyed 
and "through other arrangements and/or negotiations, 
... defendant duck club secured an alternate route 
... " ( R. 3). It was admitted by the plaintiffs' counsel 
that the club house was moved about a mile to the west 
and that the road which the Maws agreed to maintain 
could no longer be used. ( Tr. 25, 30) . Counsel further 
agreed that the moving of the club house was caused 
hy federal action, that there was no malice involved and 
that continued performance of the agreement to main-
tain the road was impossible. The court's offer to em-
panel the jury and take further evidence on this point 
was refused: 
"THE COURT: Conceding that the move-
Inent of the club house was caused by Federal 
action and the abandoned useable purpose of the 
road would be by federal action, no malice or 
breach of contract or anything else, because of 
that. It would appear that continued perform-
ance of it would be impossible. 
~IR. FULLER: It would appear that the 
continued performance, you mean by the Duck 
Club? 
THE COURT: Yes. To use the road or for 
then1 to maintain the road. 
:\IR. FULLER: In other words, it would 
excuse both parties. 
13 
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THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. FULLER: I think that is our lawsuit 
right here at this point. 
THE COURT: You want to empanel the 
jury, then come back at 2 o'clock and see if you 
can change my mind? 
MR. ~.,ULLER: We can't produce any evi-
dence to change your mind. 
THE COURT: Would it be correct as I said 
your position is such that the evidence will not 
give to this document any special or unreason-
able meaning? 
MR. FULLLER: Other than what you have 
before you right now, we can't give you anything 
else. 
THE COURT: Any special or unreasonable 
nature? 
MR. FULLER: That is right." (Tr. 35. 36). 
The trial court correctly held that the 1936 agree-
tnent is not ambiguous .However, the court repeatedly 
offered to empanel the jury and to permit the plaintiffs 
to adduce evidence as to possible mutual mistake (Tr. 
10, 15, 16, 18); special or unusual meaning of the agree-
ment ( Tr. 36, 39, 40) ; and that something else was 
intended (Tr. 30, 33, 34). Counsel for the plaintiffs in 
each instance declined to adduce evidence, stating that 
he could not produce further evidence. 
Following is the trial court's ruling with well-stated 
supporting reasons: 
"THE COURT: The Court rules as follows: 
14 
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the (._' Oll rt rules tba t the shooting privileges ar-
rived at under what is tnarket Exhibit A, the 
shooting privileges were a part of an overall 
agreement contained in what is entitled "right 
of way agree1nent," that the right of way agree-
Inent is an instrutnent defining multiple rights 
to different individuals named therein, that part 
of the consideration for each obligation is con-
tained in each and every paragraph of the con-
traet, in other words, I find that paragraph be-
ginning in the consideration of non-assessable 
privileges was not an entirely separate agree-
ment, it was tied in with the entire agreement, 
but that non-assessable shooting privileges ar-
rived at under this agreement is a right to shoot 
in return for the obligation to maintain the road 
in a travelable condition, that on the first day of 
the instrument there is no ambiguity in this mat-
ter, that the parties are in agreement, and, that 
the club house has been moved as a result of 
Federal action in the construction of a large 
Federal Dam, that the right of way referred to 
in said paragraph is no longer used by this Duck 
Club, and that the right of way used by the Duck 
Club is no longer in anyway maintained by the 
grantors in this instrument, that they agree that 
said movement of the location of the Duck Club 
was not for malice or any reason other than the 
compulsory action brought about by the con-
struction of the Federal dam, that if these are 
the only facts involved, non-suit should be 
granted." {Tr. 38, 39). 
The ruling of the court gives effect to the intention 
expressed in the contract and is supported by the law. 
It will be noted that at the end of the first para-
15 
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graph following the "Whereas" provisiOn, the agree-
ment provides: 
"This grant shall be exclusive to Grantees as 
to the purposes herein expressed except as to 
Grantor and the members of her family herein-
.after mentioned so long as Grantees and any 
successors shall maintain said Club House and 
shooting grounds for the purpose of shooting 
wild fowl.'' 
It was expressly stated that the parties intended 
the agreement to remain in effect only so long as (I) 
the club house was maintained, and ( 2) the shooting 
grounds were maintained for the purpose of shooting 
wild fowl. It may fairly be implied that the agreement 
was to be effective only so long as the club house and 
shooting grounds were maintained in the same location. 
It would be absurd to assume that the club would intend 
that they would use a road which did not lead to the 
club house, and that the Maws would be required to 
"maintain in a travelable condition" a road which was 
not used by the club. 
When the duck club road was destroyed in the con-
struction of the Willard Bay dam and reservoir the 
1936 agreement was terminated as a matter of law. The 
applicable rule of law is stated as follows: 
"Where from the nature of the contract, it is 
evident that the parties contracted on the .basis 
of the continued existence of the person, thing, 
condition, or state of things, or of facts, to which 
it relates, the subsequent perishing of the per-
sons or thing, or cessation of existence of the 
16 
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condition or state will excuse the perfortnance, 
or tenninate the contract, a condition to that 
effect being implied, in spite of the fact that the 
promise may have been unqualified. The rule has 
been limited to the situation where neither party 
is at fault and neither has assumed the risk. It 
has been referred to as the doctrine of superven-
ing impossibility of performance." 17 A C.J.S .. , 
pages 621, 622. 
La Cumbre Golf and Country Club v. Santa 
Barbara Hotel Co., 271 P.2d 476, 205 C. 422; 
Johnson v. Atkins, 127 P. 1027, 1030, 53 C.A. 2d 
430; Dairy Food Store v. Alpert, 3 P 2d 61, 116 
C.A. 670. 
The LaCumbre Golf and Country Club case in-
volved a factual situation very similar to that in the 
instant case .. A. hotel company agreed to pay to a golf 
and country club $300.00 a month for the privilege of 
having its guests enjoy the benefits of the club. The 
hotel burned down and the golf and country club never-
theless sued for the $300.00 per month due under a 
written contract, claiming that the contract gave them 
an unqualified right to the money. The court held that 
the principle stated above applied, that the contract was 
based upon the assumption that the hotel would con-
tinue to be in exisetnce and that there was an implied 
condition that if the hotel ceased to exist, the contract 
would be terminated. 
There is no provision in the contract for its termi-
nation except the one quoted above, and there is no 
prm·ision requiriny the duck club to continue to main-
tain its club ho1tse in the same location or to continue 
17 
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to maintain any shooting grounds for the purpose of 
shooting wild fowl. The location could be changed with-
out imposing any liability on the club. The Maws had 
no contract right or other right to have the status quo 
maintained. 
In the case of Southern Pacific Company, et al, 
v. Spring Valley Water Company, et al, 173 Cal. 291, 
159 P. 865, the plaintiff entered into a written contract 
with the defendant permitting the defendant to lay 
and maintain a water line within the railroad right-of-
way and in consideration thereof the water company 
agreed to permit the railroad company to have use of 
the water in the line for railroad purposes. The contract 
was silent as to the duration of the right. In a suit in-
volving the relative rights of the parties, the court held 
as follows: 
"The water works could, at any time, change 
the route of its main to other lands without vio-
lating the contract, and would thereafter have 
been relieved of the burden. The waterworks 
was authorized to own, sell, and distribute water 
to public use, and the water in question was a 
part of the water supply which it held, managed, 
and controlled for that purpose. It could at any 
time, by purchase, or i£ necessary, by condem-
nation suit, acquire a new route for its main. But 
so long as it maintained the route given, the 
right of plaintiffs was a burden or servitude 
thereon whcih entitled them to take and use water 
from the n1ain to the quantity necessary for the 
purposes specified." 
There is nothing whatever in the 1936 agreement 
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which would prevent the duck club from 1noving its 
rluh house and the change of location did not constitute 
a breach of contract. 
:!. TilE PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT DE-
NIED TliE RIGI-IT TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE 
IN SUPPORT OF THEIR CONTENTIONS. 
The first point argued by the plaintiffs and a ppel-
lants in their brief is that they should have been "per-
mitted to put on evidence to a jury establishing a third-
party beneficiary contract liability against the Weber 
Basin District." In support of this point the plaintiffs 
claim that by writing the letter to W. John Maw and 
Sons, Inc., dated July 5, 1957, (Pl. Ex. A) the Weber 
Basin \Yater Conservancy District entered into a third-
party beneficiary contract for the benefit of the plain-
tiffs which entitled plaintiffs to duck club shooting privi-
leges. (See Appellants' Brief, pp. 12-20). Although 
the heading under which this argument by the plaintiff 
is Iuade implies that the trial court refused to permit 
the plaintiffs to put on evidence in support of this point, 
there is no argument to this effect in the plaintiffs' 
brief. There is no claim made that the plaintiffs made 
any offer of proof on this subject which was refused 
by the court. The fact is that the letters of July 5, 
Hl.37 and September 11, 1955 were actually received in 
evidence (Exhibits A and D) . No argument of the 
third-party benefieiary theory was made to the trial 
court. 
The court offered to empanel the jury and to per-
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mit the plaintiffs to call witnesses to testify. The offer 
was declined not once, but many times. When the 
F j eldsted letter, Exhibit A, was offered in evidence 
the court and counsel made the following statements: 
"THE COURT: That is, evidence alone 
would not justify a different interpretation of 
the instrument than appears on its face, it would 
not carry the burden of proof necessary to give 
it special or unusual difference. If you want to 
put your evidence in so I can hear it, I will let 
you do it, or you can stand on your record and 
go up. 
MR. FULLER: We have Exhibit A that we 
are offering and it consists of three originals and 
two executed copies of the letter from Mr. Fjeld-
sted, and we offer it. 
MR. SKEEN: No objections. 
THE COURT: It will be received in evi-
dence. Do you want to proceed and see if you can 
construe this document because it sets special cir-
cumstances, or do you want to stand on your 
ground? 
MR. FULLER: I don't think we can show 
the special circumstance on it other than we have 
indicated in these arguments." (Tr. 40, 41). 
At another point in the argument the following 
statements were n1ade: 
"TI-IE COURT: I will do this. It would 
appear to me right now, suppose I do this, let 
you proceed with your evidence, empanel the 
jury and see the evidence. I will study it m?re 
during the lunch period, take it under advise-
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ment until two o'clock, and let you proceed until 
then on the theory that you are going to show 
this is an ambiguous instrument and maybe you 
can come up with some authority or some other 
persuasion, or two. I will do that. 
MR. },ULLER: We have no authority. We 
are going to stand at this point right on the con-
tract. So you can make your ruling accordingly, 
Your Honor." (Tr. 33, 34). 
The record simply does not support plaintiffs' con-
tention that they were not permitted to put on evidence 
in support of their case. No record was made to raise 
the question on appeal as to the merits of the third-
party beneficiary theory. 
3. THE \VEBER BASIN WATER CON-
SERY.A.NCY DISTRICT IS NOT ILLEGALLY 
TRESPASSING ON PLAINTIFFS' LANDS 
... -\ND RIGHTS. 
The plaintiffs' second point is that "the Weber 
Basin \Yater District is even now illegally trespassing 
on plaintiffs' lands and rights." The argument is that 
because the land purchase contract, dated July 15, 
1UJ7, between the United States and Grace B. Maw 
and \V. John Maw and Sons, Inc., contains a provision 
to the effect that title to some 988.23 acres of land shall 
be free from lien or encumbrance except: " . . . rights 
of' way for roads (including the right of way granted 
to the Ogden Duck Club across tract 95 . . . ", (See 
Exhibit C) and because a quit claim deed was made 
by the Ogden Duck Club to ,V, John Maw and Sons, 
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Inc;, and Grace B. Maw (Plaintiffs' Exhibit B), and 
because one William H. Wilcox, who plaintiffs claimed 
was an employee of the Weber Basin Water Conserv-
ancy District (a fact on which the record is silent) 
recorded the deed, the Weber Basin Water Conserv-
ancy District "is in fact a constructive trustee of the 
right of way property for the Maws." It is then argued 
that "since the right-of-way has been obliterated and 
the land made useless, the Weber Basin District should 
respond in damages both for the value of the shooting 
privileges which are tied to the right-of-way and also 
punitive damages." See Appellants' Brief, pp. 20-24). 
We are reminded of an argument in the case of 
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Wertheimer, 64 F. 2d 
438, 439, about which the court said: 
"It is so tenuous that it eludes analysis and 
so insubstantial that it merits no discussion." 
The right-of-way which was excepted from the 
land purchase contract ran to the Duck Club and crossed 
lands which were sold by W. John Maw and Sons, Inc., 
and Grace B. Maw to the United States. The deed 
was from the Duck Club to the Maws. No offer of 
proof was made to show the connection, if any, of the 
plaintiffs and the Weber Basin District with these 
instruments to which they were ,not parties. No offer 
of proof was made to present facts regarding any tres-
pass. There was no issue in the pleadings on the sub-
ject, and this all appears to be an after thought urged 
for the first time on appeal. It is entirely without merit. 
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.t. THERE \VAS NO PROOF OF ESTOPPEL 
4\CAlNS'i' THE DISTRICT. 
The plaintiffs contend in the heading of their argu-
tucn t that "the facts raise an estoppel against theW eber 
Basin District," but it is not pointed out what facts are 
relied upon to prove estoppel. The argument in the 
plaintiffs' brief consists of a reference to the case of 
\ V eber Basin Water Conservancy District v. Hislop 
(whieh had nothing to do with estoppel), a quotation 
t'rom the case of l(elly v. Richards, setting out the 
elements of estoppel, and a rambling discussion of the 
1 n:w agreement particularly with reference to the ques-
tion whether the grandsons are beneficiaries. We have 
discussed the 1936 agreen1ent under our first point. 
Although the Fjeldsted letter as a basis for estoppel 
is not 1nentioned in the appellants' brief, it was relied 
upon in arguments by plaintiffs' counsel at the trial. 
\Ye point out that the letter is simply a statement that 
the land purchase contract between the United States 
and \Y. John 1vlaw and sons, Inc., and Grace B. Maw 
does not cover any property interests in the Willard 
Bay area other than the land specifically described and 
specifically does not cover the state leases, water rights, 
rasements, licenses and duck club shooting privileges. 
:\Ir. Fjeldsted then said that any such property interests 
''which will be required in the construction of the Dam 
or which will be damaged or destroyed will be appraised 
at a later date and an offer of purchase will be made." 
It is not contended by the plaintiffs that any state-
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ment in: the letter was false. The very first element of 
estoppel referred to in the case of Kelly v. Richards, 
95 U. 506, 83 P. 2d 731, cited and quoted from in appel-
lants~ brief, p. 27, is therefore missing. The plaintiffs 
obviously did not make a case on this theory. 
5. THERE WAS NO BREACH OF CON-
TRACT BY THE OGDEN DUCK CLUB. 
The last point urged by the plaintiffs is that the 
Ogden Duck Club should respond in damages for 
breach of contract. The contract relied upon is the 1936 
agreement which we have discussed at length above. 
The plaintiffs did not, by oral or written evidence, 
prove or offer to prove the failure of the duck club to 
perform any act it had agreed to perform. When the 
location of the club house was changed, this terminated 
the 1936 agreement. 
On page 35 of the appellants' brief reference is 
made to Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
a question is raised as to the reason findings of fact 
and conclusions of law were signed and filed. Although 
this point is not included in the plaintiffs' statement of 
points, we take this opportunity to explain why these 
documents were prepared and submitted to the court. 
It will be noted frmn an examination of the transcript 
that at the time set for trial, the plaintiffs offered 
exhibits in evidence, caused the deposition of Carlyle 
Eubank to be published, and made some informal offers 
of proof. The evidence thus adduced was before the 
court and was considered in making the decisions. The 
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plaintifl's declined to call witnesses or adduce further 
eridence when ntunerous opportunities were given by 
the eourt to do so, and plaintiffs' counsel stated that 
they would stand on the contract. (Tr. 34). Under the 
l'ircumstances, the case was tried on the facts and under 
Rule ;)~, findings of fact and conclusions of law were 
necessary. 
CONCLUSION 
'rhe court correctly ruled on the evidence before 
it that the plaintiffs had no cause of action for relief 
under the 1936 agreement. Ample opportunity was 
giren to the plaintiffs to have the jury empaneled and 
to offer additional evidence in support of their case. 
They declined. They are, therefore, in no position to 
urge that the trial court deprived them of a right to a 
.i ury trial or of any other substantial or procedural 
rights. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Neil R. Olmstead 
2324 Adams Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 
E. J. Skeen 
522 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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